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Aristotle on the Principles of Perceptible Body (Gen. Corr. 2.1-3)
By David E. Hahm 
(The Ohio State University)
SAGP, April, 1993
Aristotle’s explanation of all physical change presupposes the 
existence of some perceptible body in which the change may occur.1 
Even the most fundamental change, genesis and destruction, cannot 
occur, Aristotle claims, apart from perceptible body (Gen. Corr. 
2.1.328b32-34). A knowledge of the principles (άρχαί) and elements 
(στοιχείο) is therefore fundamental to understanding all physical 
changes.2 In the first three chapters of book two of On Generation 
and Corruption, Aristotle presents his most comprehensive and 
detailed analysis of these principles.3 His conclusion is that there are, 
in fact, three sorts of principles, possessing different degrees of 
ontological priority: (1) the substrate matter or potentially perceptible 
body, (2) four perceptible contrarieties, hot, cold, wet, and dry, which 
qualify the matter to constitute perceptible body; and (3) four 
primary, actually perceptible bodies, fire, air, water, and earth, which 
change into one another and combine to form everything in the 
universe (2.1.329a 28-bl).
The interest of his discussion lies not only in the identification of
1 Many of the ideas in this paper were first aired in the Faculty Seminar on 
Aristotle’s Gen. Corr. held at the University of Cambridge (1990-91). I would like to 
thank the members of the seminar for piquing my interest in and helping me better 
understand this work. I am especially indebted to Myles Burnyeat, Geoffrey Lloyd, 
and David Furley for many specific suggestions and criticisms, which helped me to  
clarify my interpretation of the text. Work on this paper was supported by a Faculty 
Professional Leave and Seed Grant from the Ohio State University and by Corpus 
Christi College, Cambridge, which graciously extended me an appointment as Visiting 
Fellow.
2 Aristotle has a terminological problem because he himself believes that the 
material stuffs that earlier philosophers called "elements" (στοιχεία) are analyzable 
into more ultimate elements or principles. His solution was to use the term "element" 
(στοιχεΐον) and "principle" (άρχή) synonymously as generic terms for all three kinds 
of principles that he will identify: (1) matter; (2) the four contrarieties, hot, cold, wet, 
and dry; and (3) the four primary perceptible bodies, earth, water, air, and fire. The 
latter (earth, water, air, and fire), which he regards as a subset of the generic 
principles or elements, he typically designates by three terms: "the first bodies" (τα 
πρώτα σώματα), "the simple bodies" (τα απλά σώματα), or, in deference to the 
traditional usage, "the so-called elements" (τα καλούμενα στοιχεία).
3 Hereafter I shall cite this work only by book, chapter, and page. For other 
Aristotelian works I shall specify titles. Any unspecified references are to Gen. Corr.
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Aristotle ignores their disagreement, and instead finds merit in the 
fact that all of them use these primary bodies to explain the genesis 
and destruction of everything, either by the (monist) hypothesis of the 
alteration (άλλοιουμενων, μεταβαλλόντων) of a single substrate 
substance or by the (pluralist) hypothesis of aggregation and 
separation (σύγκρισίς και διάκρισις) of multiple elements.6 To 
Aristotle’s way of thinking this entails that they have correctly 
identified one type of principle or element of perceptible bodies. As a 
result, he expresses agreement with them that these primary (material 
bodies) are rightly ranked as "principles and elements" (άρχάς καί 
στοιχεία, 329a5-8).
His agreement, however, is not unqualified; he does not agree that 
the corporeal bodies that they have postulated as principles and 
elements are, in fact, the "substrate matter" that they claim them to 
be. To articulate their deficiency on this point, he compiles a second 
list of predecessors who have postulated "something alongside the 
previously mentioned [elemental bodies]" (παρά τα είρημένα, 329a8- 
9). One of these was an advocate of a single "matter" ((ίλη) who 
treated this matter as unqualified corporeal (σωματικήν) matter, 
existing as separable matter alongside the elemental bodies. Aristotle 
does not mention any names, but his allusion to this "unqualified" 
matter as "infinite" or "undifferentiated" (άπειρον) leaves little doubt 
that he was thinking of Anaximander. This theory Aristotle considers 
mistaken on the grounds that it is impossible for any body to exist 
without some perceptible contrariety. It has to be at least either light 
or heavy or cold or hot; it cannot be completely undifferentiated.
A better, but still inadequately developed, intuition of substrate 
matter is to be found, Aristotle claims, in the Timaeus, where Plato 
introduces the receptacle (πανδεχες) as a substrate prior to the so- 
called elements (υποκείμενόν τι τοίς καλουμενοις στοιχείοις  
πρότερον) and compares it to the gold of which golden objects are 
made (329al3-17).7 Aristotle finds two shortcomings in this theory: 
first, it does not adequately differentiate the receptacle from the 
elements that come to be in it and so does not define whether the 
receptacle is separable from the elements. Aristotle no doubt thinks 
that insofar as the πανδεχες is conceived as a container, it will be 
separate from and independent of the elements and as such will be
6 These theories are discussed in more detail in Gen. Cotr. 1.1.
7 The reference is to Tun. 48b-51b, and esp. 50a-c.
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detail on other occasions.
However, since the first bodies are derivative from matter in 
precisely (και) this way (i.e., as m atter plus perceptib le  
contrariety), we now really have to differentiate even these things 
(i.e., matter, contrariety, and the so-called elements) basing our 
differentiation on the belief that the matter, which is inseparable 
from Hiß perceptible bodies, but underlying the contrarieties, is a 
principle and indeed absolutely primary (πρώτην). We have 
drawn this conclusion regarding its primacy from the fact that 
(yàp) the hot is not matter for the cold nor the cold for the hot, 
but the underlying substrate is matter for both of them. 
Consequently (ώστε), (in order to articulate the differentiation 
that our account requires and believing that the matter underlying 
the perceptible contrarieties is a principle and ultimate) we contend 
that, first of all (1), the potentially perceptible body is a 
principle; secondly (2 ,^ the contrarieties (I mean, for example, 
heat and cold) are principles; and only (ήδη) in the third place 
(3), fire, water and the like are principles. I rank fire, water, etc.,· 
in the third place because (yap) they change into one another 
(not as Empedocles and others mistakenly claim; for otherwise 
there would be no such thing as alteration), whereas the 
contrarieties do not change.
Nevertheless, even so, even having differentiated the principles 
of perceptible body and ranked their degree of ultimacy, we cannot 
leave the subject of the elements and principles of perceptible body, 
but we must discuss the particular identity and the particular 
number of the various principles of body. For the others (our 
predecessors) have simply posited and used them, without giving 
any account of why they are these particular ones and this 
particular number (329a24-b6).
In the first paragraph of this passage, Aristotle presents the 
conception of the underlying substrate matter that he himself accepts 
as the ultimate principle of perceptible bodies. He presents it in 
explicit contrast to the two predecessors who had intuitions of it. This 
he does by two pairs of interlocked μέν . . .  δέ antitheses. The μέιη 
clause critiques the views of Anaximander and Plato (329a8-24), while 
the δέ j clause gives A ristotle’s alternative (329a24-27). This 
alternative itself consists of a μέν2 . . .  δέ2 opposition. The first μέν2
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brought too many answers to the questions asked. By introducing 
competing types of principles (matter and the so-called elements) and, 
what is worse, competing sets of so-called elements, the theories of 
Aristotle’s predecessors create a need for some kind of adjudication 
of their competing claims. This is precisely what Aristotle begins to 
do in the last two paragraphs of the chapter (329a27-b3).
Adjudication of the claims of the competing types of principles is 
accomplished easily. Aristotle simply specifies the principles of 
perceptible bodies in order of priority and in each case gives the 
reason for his prioritization. Substrate matter, the first principle, is 
prior to the contrarieties because it is a necessary condition for the 
existence of the contrariety. One contrariety cannot be matter for 
another; the substrate of both must be matter and hence primary 
(329a31-32). The third set of principles, the actually perceptible 
bodies which come from the combination of potentially perceptible 
body and perceptible contrariety, is posterior to the contrarieties 
because the perceptible bodies change into one another, whereas the 
contrarieties themselves are unchanging (329a35-b3). In this way, 
Aristotle differentiates and ranks the three kinds of principles of 
perceptible body: (1) the potentially perceptible body (matter), (2) the 
perceptible contrarieties which cause the perceptibility of bodies, and 
(3) the composite of these two, the first actually perceptible bodies, of 
which fire and water are examples. .
In a final paragraph, Aristotle confronts the much harder task of 
adjudicating among the sets of perceptible bodies that are competing 
for the title of first (actually perceptible) bodies. This will occupy him 
for the next two full chapters. Here he only announces his agenda and 
his reasons for undertaking it. His agenda is to establish the number 
and identity of the principles he has just differentiated. The 
differentiation (διορισμός) of different kinds of principles and their 
ontological relationships did not and could not establish the identity 
of the particular principles that fall under each kind. Matter, of 
course, presented no further problem, because it is by definition 
undifferentiated and single (cf. 1.6.322bl7-19); but the number and 
specific identity of the perceptible contrarieties and of the first bodies 
constituted by them is another matter.9
9 Com m entators usually take A ristotle here to be referring only to the 
contrarieties and to introduce only Gen. Com 2.2; but Aristotle does not say anything 
here that would restrict the scope of his inquiry to the contrarieties either in his 
announcement of his agenda or in his justification for undertaking the task. More
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step iri his undertaking. Our senses tell us that bodiès have all sorts of 
perceptible properties, but not all are primitive and constitutive of a 
primary perceptible body. Aristotle’s challenge is to decide which 
ones they are. The number and nature of primary contrarieties, in 
turn, will determine the number and nature of primary bodies. Every 
different combination of primary contrarieties will constitute a 
different primary body; one pair will constitute two primary bodies, 
two pairs will make four primary bodies, three pairs will produce eight 
bodies, and so forth. Also, whatever particular contrarieties are 
primary will determine the nature of the first perceptible bodies from 
which everything comes and in terms of which everything must be 
explained. In short, the coherence and efficacy of Aristotle’s entire 
schem e of explanation in physical philosophy hangs on his 
determination of the primary qualities.
The approach that Aristotle choses for this critical project is the 
method of elimination. Therein lies one of the challenges of his 
project for the modern reader. For Aristotle never ennumerates his · 
criteria of primacy; they must be deduced from his practice. That is a 
challenging undertaking. Given the interdependence of the number 
and nature of primary contrarieties and the number and nature of 
primary bodies, there are two ways Aristotle can approach the 
problem of their number and nature. He can start by establishing the 
number and nature of the primary bodies and then examine how many 
and which contrarieties will be required to produce these bodies. Or 
he can determine independently how many and which contrarieties 
are primary and then derive the number and nature of the primary 
bodies from these. Aristotle choses the second. Starting from the full 
range of perceptible properties, he eliminates all that fail to meet the 
criteria of "primacy."
Aristotle conducts his elimination in two stages. First he eliminates 
all but tangible contrarieties from consideration (329b7-16); then he 
eliminates all but four of the tangible contrarieties, specifically, hot, 
cold, wet, and dry (329bl6-330a29). The first stage is performed so 
swiftly that we hardly notice what has happened:
Since (a) we are seeking principles of perceptible body, (b) 
that is of tangible body, and (c) tangible is that of which touch is 
the sensation, clearly (d) not all contrarieties constitute species 
of body and principles (e.g. the primary bodies), but only those
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contrariety" (κατ ’ έναντίωσίν τ€ yàp διαφέρουσι, καί κατά απτήν 
έναντίωσιν, 329b 10-11).
The usual explanation for Aristotle’s lack of explanation is that he 
equated perceptible body with tangible body. Some interpreters have 
suggested he did so on the grounds that alt perceptible bodies possess 
at least some of the tangible qualities','whërëas not allexhibit qualities 
that are the objects of vision, hearing, taste, or smell.10 Another has 
cited Aristotle’s thesis in De An. 2.2-3.413all-415al3 that touch is the 
most fundamental sense and the only sense universal to all animals, 
though he must acknowledge that this does not yield a valid argument 
that tangible contrarieties are the defining properties of perceptible 
matter.11 Still it is strange that Aristotle would leave an important 
premise like the claim that perceptible body is equivalent to tangible 
body not only unsupported, but unexpressed. In both declarations of 
the move, Aristotle skips over the assumed equation and simply adds 
the alleged equivalent ("tangible") to the previous proposition, in the 
first instance as a self-evident replacement for "perceptible," in the 
second as an addition ( x e . . .  και).
I suggest that all these explanations are wrong. I would further 
suggest that Aristotle does not and could not equate perceptible body 
with tangible body, but that he understands "tangible" and "tangible 
body" in their natural sense as species of "perceptible" and 
"perceptible body." Then his claim is not that one must seek the 
principles of tangible body because tangible body is logically  
equivalent to perceptible body or universally assumed iii Greek 
culture, but that we must seek the principles of tangible body because 
its specific principles are, in fact, the only principles for all perceptible 
body.
The key to understanding Aristotle’s move here and the rapidity 
with which he makes it must be his discussion in Gen. Corr. 1.6. 
There, justifying his philosophical agenda for the rest of the treatise, 
he says that a discussion of the status and genesis of the so-called 
elements is a necessary precondition for discussing the genesis of 
compound bodies; but prior to such a discussion of the first bodies, he 
declares, one must clarify two hitherto inadequately articulated topics 
(1.6.322bl-6). Everyone agrees, he argues, that the generation of the 
so-called elements themselves and of compounds from these elements
10 E.g., Joachim (above, note 4) 201-202.
11 Williams (above, note 4) 157.
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that genesis and destruction presuppose mutual contact. Only 
tangible body is capable of mutual contact, so only tangible body can 
function as principle in the explanation of genesis and destruction and 
only tangible contrarieties qualify as principles.15
The second step in Aristotle’s search for the number and identity of 
the contrarieties that constitute primary perceptible bodies gives 
Aristotle more difficulty. He must determine which contrarieties are 
primary and constitutive and which are not. He does this by collecting 
all the recognized tangible contrarieties, then eliminating those that 
do not qualify as principles. The tangible contrarieties that he starts 
with are: hot-cold, dry-wet, heavy-light, hard-soft, elastic-brittle, 
rough-smooth, and coarse-fine (329b 18-20).
His first elimination is of heavy and light, which are disqualified as 
being capable neither of causing action nor of being affected. The 
criterion itself (capable of causing action or being affected) he 
justifies on the same grounds that we just considered with reference to 
tangibility. The elements must be capable of mutual acting and being 
affected, if they are to change into one another and mix to form 
compounds. Any contrariety that does not act on something or is not 
affected by something is disqualified. But then we must ask what he 
means by saying that the heavy and the light "are not said to do 
anything to something else (noielu τι erepoi/) or to be affected by 
something else" (329b21-22). He admits that everything physical is 
either heavy or light or both (1.6.323a7-9), and he has even admitted 
that heavy and light things have the capacity to act or be affected" 
(1.6.323a7-10). We can only assume that he holds that heavy and light 
things do not act or experience effects qua heavy or light.16 Even
15 This claim entails that tangible contrarieties are prior to non-tangible 
contrarieties. In a short digression he (329bl4-16) reconciles this with suggestions he 
made elsewhere that vision is more valuable that touch and hence prior (cf. Eth. Nie. 
1176a1; Probt. 886b35). This might suggest that visible contrarieties might be prior to 
tangible. Aristotle does not deny that, but points out that the visible contrarieties of 
tangible body are not properties of tangible body qua tangible. Since only the 
contrarieties of body qua tangible qualify as principles of genesis and destruction, the 
priority of visible contrarieties in another sense does not affect the priority of tangible 
contrarieties as principles of genesis and destruction.
16 Cf. Joachim (above, note 4) 204; and Williams (above, note 4) 158. Williams’ 
explanation that heavy and light do not communicate their contrariety to other things 
is not a sufficient explanation. While it may be true that a heavy body does not make 
light bodies heavy, in the way that a hot body warms à cooler body, Aristotle does not 
construe the action of heating as transmitting its own power, but he defines it as 
"causing association among homogeneous things" (329b26-27). Heavy and light,
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that qualifies them to serve as causes of elemental and other kinds of 
change in the world.
This last point bears further examination. Aristotle’s decision to 
make perceptible qualities serve as constitutive principles of the 
physical world obligated him to give the contrarieties an objective 
physical status that the terms themselves tend to obscure. To the 
modern reader "hot" and "cold" suggest a continuum of temperature 
within which the alleged contrarieties cannot be located without a 
percipient to distinguish the hotter from the colder. "Wet" and "dry" 
have an additional problem. They suggest a mixture of ontologically 
prior bodies (water and waterless stuff), and hence a derivative rather 
than primary status. Aristotle had to escape both these implications if 
he was to use these tangible properties as principles.18
A ristotle’s definitions show how he did it. He escaped the 
subjectivity implied by hot and cold by grounding their difference in a 
qualitative difference in the activity that defines their essence. Both 
hot and cold possess the generic capacity of causing association 
(σύγκρισίς); but the specific kind of "association" is inherently 
different for each. That difference can be recognized from the kinds 
of objects that are susceptible to it. Hot causes association only of 
things that are of the same kind (τα όμογβυη); cold brings together 
and causes association of things of the same kind (όμογβυη) as well as 
of things that are unrelated (τα μή ομόφυλα). Hot and cold differ, 
therefore, in their objectively real effects.19 When hot acts upon 
something, it segregates things by kind, causing aggregation and 
coalescence of the things that are the same in kind. Its specific effect 
on a body or mixture of bodies will depend on the nature of the 
object, specifically its homogeneity or the nature of its heterogeneity,
18 To avoid this implication some translators prefer ’'fluid” and "solid,” but this 
obscures the fact that the ambiguity is not only modern, but was felt already by the 
Greeks themselves. When Aristotle explicitly discusses various senses in which "wet” 
and "dry” were used, he shows that the Greek terms "wet" and "dry" ambiguously 
denote either physical states or different mixtures of water and dry stuff (2.2.330al2- 
24). This shows it to be a real problem facing Aristotle, not merely a problem of 
translation into English.
19 Aristotle adds a clarification and rebuttal of those who claim that fire (which 
must be hot) "separates" (διακρίνείν) things, presumably by reducing compounds into 
more elementary stuffs. Aristotle explains thait this activity is really "association” 
(συγκρίυειν) viewed from a different perspective. The destruction and separation 
really produces association of things of the same kind by removing what is not of the 
same kind ( 2.2.329b27-29).
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are all referred (άναγονται) to the primary four" (2.2.330a24-25). 
The word "led up to" or "referred to" (άνάγεσθαι) suggests that he 
believes the remaining four pairs of contrarieties can be explained in 
terms of the primary four and hence do not themselves qualify as 
additional or prior principles. How precisely he thinks they are to be 
explained has to be deduced from his practice.
One of the four pairs, smooth and rough, he simply ignores. We 
can understand why. His definition of smooth and rough, given in the 
Categories is that the smooth consists in "all the parts lying on a flat 
plane," while the rough consists in "[some parts] extending beyond and 
[others] not quite meeting [the surface] (Cat. 8.10a 17, 22). Smooth 
and rough are, therefore, specific characteristics of the surface or 
boundary of a body. Since the boundary has been stipulated by 
Aristotle’s definitions to be the result of the contrarieties of wet and 
dry, the pair of smooth and rough may be dismissed as derivative of 
wet and dry directly, without further discussion. The other three pairs 
are more problematic and philosophically interesting.
The first of these, thick and thin, Aristotle treats at some length, 
thereby revealing his rationale (329b34-330a4). He begins with the 
premise that the capacity to fill something (τό άι/αηληστικόι/) belongs 
to the wet. His justification shows that he derived his first premise 
from his definition of the wet. The wet, he says, is (1) "not bounded 
by its own boundary, but (2) easily shaped or bounded." Then to this 
definition he adds a contingent condition (contact with another body) 
and the consequence of that contact, i.e., that it (3) "follows 
(ακολουθεί^) the thing that touches it." This consequence, 
conforming to the container with which it is in contact, is equivalent to 
"the capacity of filling [something]." In other words, he argues that to 
fill something is a capacity that wet derives from its nature as 
absolutely shapeable with no capacity whatsoever, to retain shape on 
its own; but, he contends, it is only present under one condition, an 
interaction with another body. Thus it is a reactive affection that 
occurs under a particular interactive condition. As a result, Aristotle 
does not say "the wet is capable of filling" or "the capacity to fill is the 
wet," but rather "the capacity to fill belongs to (literally "is of') the 
wet." By this he means that it is one of the capacities of the wet when 
the wet finds itself in the stipulated circumstances (in contact with a 
container).
After having established this premise, Aristotle adds his second
-  19 -
characteristic of physical body that is denoted by the term "thin" 
(λεπτοί/). He concludes by saying that the fine is "especially like that" 
(μάλιστα τοιουτον), viz. (metaphorically) fine-parted, capable of 
total contact with the surface of a container, and capable of "filling 
[something]."
What Aristotle has done in this argument is to derive the "capacity 
of filling [something] analytically from the nature of "the fine," which 
he understands to be such as to cause its possessor to react in the way 
that a body made of very small particles would react under the same 
conditions. In the limiting case of small-parted stuff, which will be 
identical with the case of continuous "thin" matter, there will be total 
contact with another body. In other words:
Thin <— > Total contact <— > Capable of filling
The derivation of the capacity for filling from the definition of thé 
fine follows the same strategy that he used in deriving the capacity for 
filling something from the definition of the wet. In both cases the 
capacity to fill is regarded as a logical implication of the definition of 
the term under the condition of contact with another body. The fact 
that the definitions logically imply the same affective response to 
contact with a container gives Aristotle his warrant for claiming they 
are not independent constitutive principles. Though Aristotle goes on 
to use this warrant to exclude the thin and the thick from the status of 
principles, he does not then draw the conclusion that they are 
identical, that is, merely two names for the same property. He treats 
each as a real physical property; This is enough to eliminate thin and 
thick as a‘third pair of contrariety principles alongside hot and cold 
and wet and dry, but it is not enough to warrant privileging wet and 
dry over thin and thick. To discover Aristotle’s grounds for privileging 
wet and dry, we must look more carefully at his procedure here and in 
subsequent examples.
The only way Aristotle can show one of the two equivalent 
contrarieties to be primary is to show that the other is derived from it. 
Here Aristotle must show that thin is in some way a derivative of the 
wet. He expresses its derivative relationship unmistakably by claiming 
that "the thin is of the wet” (του ύγροΟ), We must consider what he 
means by that.
His actual argument runs as follows:
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state of easy shapeability.22 Aristotle gives us a clue as to what that 
modification might be in Gen. Corr. 1.10, where in a discussion of 
mixture he ranks wet things as the most easily mixed because they are 
most divisible (διαιρετά). This he then explains by saying that "the 
wet is most easily shaped (εύόριστον), unless it is elastic" (γλίσχρον, 
1.10.328b 1-5).
Evidently, he has in mind to treat elastic and brittle like fine and 
thick. Elasticity is to be defined in terms of divisibility, as thinness 
was defined in terms of the ability to fill (something). Specifically, the 
elastic is less easily divided than the wet. The wet, for its part; 
possesses divisibility as a consequence of the shapeability (εύόριστον) 
by which it was defined. Consequently, the elastic is derived from the 
wet and may be explained in terms of the shapeability of the wet. But 
in the case of the elastic, unlike the case of the thin, we are not left in 
doubt as to why the wet is primary and the elastic is derived. The 
elastic conforms only partially to the definition of the wet; the elastic 
is easily shaped, but not nearly as easily as the wet. To some extent, 
the elastic retains a shape of its own, at least enough to allow it to be 
stretched somewhat without breaking. In so far as it is somewhat 
shape-retentive, it possesses a defining characteristic of the dry. It is, 
therefore, a contrariety that is not as totally "wet” as the wet itself, but 
has some admixture of "dry" in it.
The conception of the pair of contrarieties elastic and brittle as 
derived by "mixing" dry and wet is reflected even more clearly in the 
description Of brittle as "completely dry (τό τελέως ξηρόν) so as to be 
solidified on account of its lack of wetness (δΓ ελλειψιυ ύγρότηχος, 
330a6-7).23 This description of what is brittle leaves no doubt that 
Aristotle regarded the contrarieties as being mixed in the objects in 
which they reside.
We are now beginning to get a clearer picture of how Aristotle 
thought he could justify ranking wet and dry as principles while 
making thin and thick, or elastic and brittle derivatives of wet and dry. 
Wet and dry constitute a continuum that may be explained as a
22 In Meteor. 4-9.387a.ll-1,2 he describes elastic as being "ductile" as well as wet or 
soft (έλκτόν 5 υγρόν ου ή μαλακόν). Bodies whose compostion is like a chain 
become elastic, he says, by interlocking (tf¡ έπαλλάξει) and so can extend and 
contract to some degree (Meteor. 4.9.387all-14). This makes it clear that this 
contrariety implies'a higher·degree of cohesion than wet does.
23 Brittle is characterized as "breaking quickly" (θραύεται tà  κραΟρα ταχέως, Part. 
An. 2.9¿>55a32)..
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When a (solid) object conies into contact with the wet, the wet moves 
away and, in fact, flows around the invading object.24 When a (solid) 
object conies into contact with the soft, the soft retains its own 
boundary, but that boundary yields into itself." Elsewhere, Aristotle 
cites water and wax as examples of the difference between the wet 
and the soft and points out that in the case of wax, but not of water, 
the surface yields inward and becomes indented {Meteor. 4.9.386a 18- 
26). Thus the soft belongs to the wet by virtue of possessing the same 
characteristics of shapèability, but in lesser degree.
At the other end of the continuum, we find "the hard," which he 
argues is a property of the solidified (πεπηγός). Since the solidified is 
dry, he concludes that hard belongs to the dry (2.2.330all-12). His 
reasoning here is similar to that regarding the brittle. There he 
maintained that solidification is the result of being completely dry and 
that solidity is equivalent to brittleness. Here he claims that hardness 
is another result of the solidification that accompanies dryness.25
We may depict the relationship as follows:
<r~ Soft—> <-—Hard
Aristotle’s rationale for making wet and dry principles and deriving 
the other tangible qualities from them appears to have been the 
greater explanatory power of wet and dry. Wet and dry, by mixing, 
could explain the widest range of states of shapèability. The fact that
24 In 2.2.330a9 Aristotle says the wet changes position (μεθιστάμενοι/). In a 
parallel explanation in Meteor. 4 .4 .382all-14, he uses the word “flow around’ 
(άνχιπερικχτασθαι). At Meteor. 4.9.386a.25-26 he uses άνχιμβθίσχαχβι,
25 The argument is excessively brief and, as it stands, not very clear; but its 
parallelism to the argument for the derivation of brittle from dry seems obvious. Cf. 
Williams (above, note 4) 211.
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III. The First Bodies
Once Aristotle has established the number and identity of the 
primary contrarietijSS»,:the number and identity of the primary bodies 
follows naturally and immediately. Though Aristotle does not 
mention it again, the defining characteristic of any primary body is the 
capacity to act and be affected, which leads him to assume without 
discussion that the first bodies will be characterized by a pair of 
contrarieties, one active and one passive. The four active and passive 
contrarieties logically make four possible pairings. Theoretically, four 
items can form six com binations, but since these item s are 
contrarieties and contrarieties cannot be combined with each other, 
two combinations are impossible (viz. hot with cold and wet with 
dry).28 That means that there can only be four combinations: (1) hot 
and dry, (2) wet and hot, (3) cold and dry, and (4) cold and wet. 
These, Aristotle points out, accompany the four simple bodies that 
appear to our senses (τοις άπλοις φαιι/ομέι/οις σώμασι) in a rational 
pattern (κατά λόγοι/).29 Fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet, water 
cold and wet, and earth cold and dry. Then, having stipulated the first 
bodies that qualify as principles, Aristotle appears to conclude his 
argument by affirming that the differentiating characteristics are 
distributed in a rational pattern (εύλόγως) to the first bodies and that 
the number of first bodies is rationally grounded (κατά λόγοι/).
This might seem to be the end of the matter. He has fulfilled his 
agenda of articulating the different kinds of principles of perceptible 
matter, of identifying them, and of showing why they have to be the 
particular number and particular ones that he claims. As he suggested 
in raising the question in the first place, he is following in the wake of
28 We might note that they would also be ruled out on the grounds of lacking 
capacity for mutual action and affection, for a combination of two active or two 
passive contrarieties would yield first bodies which could only act or only experience 
affection, not both.
29 Williams (above, note 4) 160 takes the phrase τοΐς άπλοις φαιι/ομέι/οις 
σώμασι to mean "the apparently simple bodies," which he then takçs as a reference to 
a later paragraph where Aristotle seems to say fire is not pure unmixed "hot-dry" first 
body. Against this interpretation is Aristotle’s word order (άπλοις φαινομένοις) and 
the fact that the whole movement of the argument demands that "simple bodies" refer 
to the theoretically constituted hot-dry first body, φαιι/ομέι/οις, I should think, ought 
to be explained, not by a paragraph later in the chapter, but by the very next sentence, 
which is linked by yap. On this interpretation, see Joachim (above, note 4) 213. The 
meaning of κατά λόγον  is disputed. I shall return to it later.
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this point.
The conclusion that Aristotle reached regarding the number and 
identity of the primary bodies is followed immediately by a review of 
the predecessors that postulated one Or more of the primary bodies as 
principles or elements. This cannot fail to remind readers, if they 
have forgotten, that Aristotle’s entire theory of the principles of 
perceptible body was presented as a rigorously argued clarification 
and correction of his predecessors. The task that Aristotle just 
completed, i.e., showing why the first bodies had to be precisely four  ^
(earth, water, air, and fire) fell to Aristotle, by his own admission, 
because this group of predecessors had declared a specific number of 
corporeal bodies to be principles and elements without demonstrating 
why. But their failure, in Aristotle’s eyes, could not have been only a 
failure to justify their choice of number and nature of the primary 
body or bodies. Their lack of agreement signaled a more fundamental ·> 
failure. At least some of them had failed even to discern the correct 
answer. That raises the question: why did Aristotle cite predecessors 
who not only had followed an insufficiently rigorous method, but were 
also patently wrong?
It must be noted that Aristotle did not cite all his predecessors on 
the subject of the elem ents of perceptible body; he om itted  
Anaxagoras and the atomists, though he included them in his review 
of predecessors in Gen. Corr. 1.1.31 His reason can only be that 
Anaxagoras and the atomists held the number of elem ents or 
principles to be infinite and the earth, water, air, and fire of our 
experience, not to be simple, but composite bodies.31 2 But if these 
predecessors were omitted because o f thèir erroneous conception of 
the principles or elements, why did he include others who also had an 
erroneous conception, albeit one that was slightly closer to the truth?
When we look at the predecessors that Aristotle cited for his 
conception of substrate matter, we see that both of them had seen 
something of the truth. Plato was much closer; his only failure was 
leaving some aspects undefined and failing to apply the concept aS 
extensively  as he might have. But the other predecessor, 
Anaximander, wrong as he was in making his principle corporeal, had 
in his "Unbounded" at least a partially correct intuition that thére
31 The absence of Anaxagoras’ theory from the catalog of Gen. Con. 1.1 shows 
that the omissions there cannot be based on Aristotle’s prior rejection of atomism.
32 Aristotle characterizes their views in Gen. Con. 1.1.314al4-bl.
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they divide the intermediate into one or two, Aristotle holds that their 
theories may be taken together for conceptual analysis. Both 
recognize as elements a pair of extremes (earth and fire) and an 
intermediate which is explained as a mixture of the two extreme 
elements (330b 13-19). Aristotle does not draw any explicit parallels 
between this theory and his own, as he did in the case of the monists; 
but he does use two words, "mean" (μέσοι/) and "mixture (μίγμα), 
that remind us of concepts that play important roles in his own theory 
of the formation of compounds.34
Finally, he gets to Empedocles, who starts off immediately with the 
four simple bodies as elements. This, of course, does resemble an 
aspect of Aristotle’s theory, but that resemblence turns out not to be 
Aristotle’s concern here. Instead, he focuses attention on the fact that 
when using his four elements as explanatory principles, he sets up an 
opposition (άι/πιτίθησιι/) between fire and the other three (330bl9- 
21). This opposition so struck Aristotle that he noted it in Metaph. 1.4 
as well, where he goes further and says that Empedocles treated earth, 
air, and water as "one nature" (φύσις).35 Thus in Empedocles’ theory 
of four principles of genesis and destruction Aristotle discovers a 
significant opposition or antithesis operative in their interaction, an 
opposition that sets fire against all the other elements.
As in the case of the proponents of two or three elements, Aristotle 
draws no explicit parallels between the theory of Empedocles and his 
own; but if we look ahead ten lines to the last major segment of the 
chapter, we find a series of observations on the relationships among 
the elements in Aristotle’s own theory (330b30-331a6). The order in 
which he makes these observations and the nature of the relationships 
held up for scrutiny shows a remarkable coincidence with the theories 
just elucidated and suggests an overarching unity and purpose in this 
final section.
The first observation Aristotle makes is that of the four elements 
two belong to each of the two major regions of the universe. Fire and 
air belong to those that move toward the periphery, whereas earth and 
water belong to those that move toward the middle (330b30-33). The 
natural movements of the four first bodies thus make an unmistakable 
statement about an essential dichotomy underlying the four first
34 Cf. esp. Cien. Con. 2.7.
35 Fragment 62 (Diels-Kranz) may have been the kind of text to which Aristotle is 
alluding.
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he attributed to the dualists and triadists, namely, that fire and earth 
are thé two elements whose mixture constitutes the intermediate 
element or elements. Aristotle’s treatment of extreme elements as 
"purest" and intermediate as "mixed,” which Aristotle draws as a 
corollary of their division into extremes and means, makes little sense 
as a description of the theory he has been developing in Gen. Corr. 
2.1-3; but it does make sense when it is construed as an observation of 
the first bodies in the natural world.36 In the natural world of our 
experience we never encounter pure elemental hot-wet "air," but we 
live in ah atmosphere in which hot and wet are mixed with hot and dry 
in such a way that the proportion of hot and dry diminishes as one 
approaches the periphery of the sublunar world (Meteor. 1.3.340b 14- 
29; l;4.341b6-24; 2.4.359b27-34, 360a21-27). Similarly, water and 
earth tend to be mixed near the surface of the earth, whereas the 
purest cold and dry is to be found near the center. Thus Aristotle 
seems to be claiming in Gen. Corr. 2.3, not that some elemental bodies 
are constituted from a mixture of others, but that they are 
encountered in the world mixed with the extreme elemental bodies.
Aristotle in Gen. Corr. 2.3 does not explain why this should be; he 
simply asserts it. But in Gen. Corr. 1.10, in his explanation of mixture,' 
he tells us that one of the properties derivable from wet and dry is 
ease Of dlvisability and difficulty of disability. Ease of divisability, in 
turn, he stipulates to be a necessary condition of mixture (1.10.328a33- 
b23). On this theory, bodies endowed with "wetness" could be 
expected to be more susceptible to mixture, whereas dry bodies could 
be expected to be less susceptible. Thus he can ground this second 
observable feature of the natural world in the contrarieties and their 
distribution.
36 Joachim (above, note 4) 218 attempts to make it refer to the motions of the 
intermediate first bodies on the grounds that the previous observation referred to the 
two natural motions (toward the periphery and toward the middle); but though 
Aristotle does say the intermediate bodies (air and water) move both up and down, he 
never calls this characteristic "mixed” motion. In fact, he explicitly claims single 
bodies never possess mixed motions; mixed motions aré indicative of compounds {De 
Cae!. 3.3.302b5-7).
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of which is more noticeable to a percipient than the other. The 
perceived pattern of opposition, however, is still the same:
This pattern of opposition (εναντία) is peculiarly relevant to 
Aristotle’s analysis of Empedocles in his final review of predecessors 
(330bl9-21), since Empedocles made use of the process of opposition 
(άντιτίθησιν) in explaining the interaction of the four elements; but 
its relevance does not end with providing a parallel for the nature of 
the relationship between sets of elements. Aristotle’s pattern of 
opposition gives an explanation for the one opposition of Empedocles’ 
theory that he had not yet explained.
Aristotle’s explanation of the monists’ intuition of contrariety 
between upward moving hot bodies and downward moving cold 
bodies explained the opposition between fire and earth. His 
explanation of the dualists’ and triadists’ intuition of contrariety 
between extreme (unmixed), dry elements and intermediate (mixed), 
wet elem ents explained the opposition between fire and the 
intermediate body, the triadists’ air, the only intermediate primary 
body postulated by any members of this group (dualists and 
triadists).37 Now, last of all, Aristotle’s explanation of the opposition 
of fire and water on the basis of a doubly opposed pair of contrarieties 
caps his explanation of Pre-Socratic intuitions by providing a n , 
explanation that, combined with the previous two, accounts for 
Empedocles’ intuition of an antithesis between fire and the other 
three elements.
Strictly speaking, it was unnecessary. Aristotle’s explanation of the 
opposition between extremes and intermediates on the basis of the 
contrarieties dry and wet had already grounded fire’s opposition to 
water, which like air is wet. Why Aristotle added this final 
observation on the double opposition of air and water (contrary in two 
affections) is not explained. He may very well have wished to find a 
Pre-Socratic intuition for each of the three possible divisions of the
37 A ristotle’s explanation also covered the pair of perceptible bodies that 
Parmenides postulated as intermediate; but on Aristotle’s interpretation of him as a 
dualist, these bodies had to be regarded as compounds.
—Fire Hot
Air
Water
Earth
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23).
There are problems, however, with such an interpretation. The 
most Serious is that it cannot be reconciled with what we have found 
to be Aristotle’s grounds for assigning primacy to the contrarieties, 
hot, cold, wet, and dry. Aristotle’s principal reason for regarding 
these as primaty to other definitionally related contrarieties was the 
fact that they are the extremes, within which the others can be 
explained as mixtures and hence derivative. It seems incredible that 
after a procedure like that Aristotle could turn around and claim the 
simple bodies are constituted by moderatedegrees of their constitutive 
contrarieties.
I suggest that he never did. This passage, following immediately 
upon his account of the theory of Empedocles and preceding his 
correct (Aristotelian) explanation of the Pre-Socratic intiutions is, I 
contend, a continuation of his account of Empedocles.38 It was, then, 
Empedocles, not Aristotle, who alleged that the elemental bodies that 
we perceive in the natural world are not simple, but mixtures, viz. of 
more than one sim ple body, yet named after the one that 
predominates.39 It was Empedocles, too, who explained fire and ice 
as excesses, again, of one of the (Empedoclean) simple bodies. 
Aristotle’s terminology and conceptualization in this passage is, 
naturally, Aristotelian. Aristotle had shortly before, reinterpreted the 
monists’ rarefaction and condensation as effects of the (Aristotelian) 
active principles, hot and cold. Now, I suggest, he is reinterpreting 
Empedocles in terms of his own Aristotelian theories. It is perhaps 
not accidental that in his "interpretations" of all three categories of 
Pre-Socratics, the Pre-Socratic explanatory principles turn out to be 
ones that also appear in Aristotle’s own Meteorology and biological 
works: boiling (ζέσ ις ) and solidification (πίιξις), mixture, and 
condensation and rarefaction.
If we take 330b21-30 as Aristotle’s description of an Empedoclean 
intuition of the role of heat in boiling and solidification, his 
explanation of the paired opposition of elements (fire vs. water; air vs. 
earth) and the perceived dominent tangible property of each element 
has more point than if it only serves as one part of an explanation of
38 So it is treated by C. Mugler, Aristote: De la Génération et de la Corruption 
(Paris 1966) 50-51.
39 The theory here described is consistent with and implicit in A ristotle’s 
discussion of Empedocles in Gen. Con. 1.1. See Appendix below.
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of his predecessors’ errors (330b7-331a6) becomes clear. Aristotle 
concluded his declaration of the distribution of the primary qualities 
among the primary bodies with the claim that as a result the 
distribution is rational (εύλόγως) and the number of elements is 
"rational" or "proportional" (κατά λόγον, 330b6-7). The precise 
meaning of εύλόγως and κατά λόγον in this sentence is not obvious; 
but if Aristotle was attempting to explain his predecessors’ errors in 
counting the elements on the basis of this very distribution, we cannot 
help suspecting that κατά λόγον refers to the rational pattern of 
distribution of contrarieties, which displays different patterns when 
viewed from different perspectives. Then he is claiming that this 
rational pattern of distribution was noticed already by the earliest 
theoreticians, but they misconstrued it. It took Aristotle to discover 
the truth about this rational structure in nature and its role in the 
history of philosophy.
With this clarification of the philosophical significance of the Pre- 
Socratic theories of elements Aristotle brings to a close his discussion 
of the principles of perceptible bodies. He had embarked on this 
subject with the intent of explaining the first bodies and their role as 
principles of genesis and destruction. Jumping off from the theories 
of the Ionian philosophers who first proposed simple elemental bodies 
as principles of change, he probed behind these to discover even more 
fundamental principles, one of which was anticipated by another 
Ionian and by his teacher Plato. These ultimate principles will 
become for Aristotle the foundation of all explanations of material 
change in the natural world. In the end Aristotle’s exposition comes 
around full circle to those Ionians from which it began, to show them 
not so much as confused misadventurers in the quest for truth, but as 
successful explorers who, without realizing what they had really done, 
had caught a glimpse of the new world of imperceptible reality lying at 
the very foundations of the universe. By showing how even the errors 
of their incompatible and incorrect theories derived from the true 
structure of the natural world as he himself had come to understand 
it, Aristotle gained for his own theories the support of the wisest 
philosophers of the past and at the same time forged the first links 
with the phenomenal world that he proposed to explain.
- 3 9 -
they are only "hot-white", "cold-wet," "heavy-hard,” etc. Thus Aristotle 
can claim that these "simple bodies" are "fiery, "watery," etc., but not 
"fire," "water,” etc. However, after they have separated out and 
collected into masses in which one kind predominates enough to 
warrant the name "fire," "air," etc., they still are not completely 
separated from each other. The apparent genesis of one element 
from another is evidence of that. The only way Empedocles can 
explain the (apparent) genesis of one element from another is to 
assume that even relatively pure aggregations of the same kind of 
element are nevertheless mixtures, including small portions of all the 
others (cf. De Cael. 3.7). So fire must be deemed a mixture in which 
there is a predominance of hot-white, which Aristotle then may 
describe in his own vocabulary as an "excess of heat," or (translating 
Empedocles’ "hot-white" into his own "hot-dry”) a "boiling of the hot 
and dry."
